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 Abstract 
It is generally assumed that individuals take national economic performance into account 
while voting. But the question of how perceptions about the economy may be influenced 
by partisan media remains understudied. Analyzing survey data from Turkey with 
various robust analysis techniques we demonstrate that reliance on pro-government 
media as a news source makes voters’ economic perceptions significantly more favorable, 
which in turn increases the likelihood of incumbent vote. In addition, we demonstrate 
that the audience of pro-government media are more likely to display “sociotropic 
overestimation”—thinking that the national economy has done better compared to their 
own household experience; and “counterfactual rationalization”—thinking, regardless of 
how they view actual economic performance, that it could be worse under alternative 
leadership. The results suggest that when the economy is manifestly deteriorating, 
authoritarian incumbents may try to use media influence to convince the electorate that 
the status quo is better than the alternatives. 
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Introduction 
Economic voting studies are based on the premise that individuals evaluate how the 
economy is doing while deciding on whom to vote for in the elections. Those who have 
more favorable evaluations of the economy will tend to reward the incumbents by voting 
for them. A rich literature, mostly based on US and British data, demonstrates that 
measures of economic evaluation appear as strong predictors of voting behavior at the 
individual level. Micro-level results from surveys also receive support from macro-level 
studies that demonstrate that incumbent vote share follows voter confidence in the 
economy closely (and objective changes in the economy more remotely). As Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmeier (2000, p. 211) conclude a review of the field, “For all democratic nations 
that have received a reasonable amount of study, plausible economic indicators, objective 
or subjective, can be shown to account for much of the variance in government support.”  
Recent scholarship has questioned the theoretical premise behind the individual-
level results, reminding that the causal arrow between economic evaluation and party 
choice points both ways. Evans and Anderson (2006), for example, argue that partisans 
are likely to form evaluations of the state of the economy that are consistent with their 
previously held beliefs. Proponents of the “revisionist argument” on economic voting 
also conjecture that news media is a likely source of bias in the formation of economic 
evaluations (Wleizen et al., 1997; Evans and Anderson, 2006), but they do not test this 
argument. This is an important gap, in light of evidence indicating that incumbents may 
be influencing how the media frames economic news, especially in less-than-fully-
democratic settings (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Rozenas and Stukal, forthcoming). 
In this study, based on individual-level data collected in February 2018 from a 
representative sample of the Turkish voting age population and using a variety of robust 
analysis techniques, we can both confirm basic assumptions about the economic voting 
mechanism and generate new evidence regarding how exactly media interferes with this 
mechanism. Reliance on pro-government media as a news source makes voters’ economic 
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evaluations significantly more favorable, which in turn increases their likelihood of voting 
for the incumbent, controlling for past voting behavior. We demonstrate that viewing 
pro-government media makes respondents more likely to think that the national 
economy has done better than their own household, a situation that we call “sociotropic 
overestimation.” In addition, voters consider not only how the economy is faring under 
the incumbent, but also how it would possibly fare under alternative leadership. We 
demonstrate that, regardless of how they view actual economic performance, the 
audience of pro-government TV are more likely to think that it could be worse under 
alternative leadership— a situation that we call “counterfactual rationalization.” Our 
analysis therefore suggests one explanation for why voters, without fooling themselves 
about their own economic situation, may still keep voting for an incumbent performing 
badly: It is because government influence over news media makes the national economic 
costs of not re-electing the incumbent look higher than it probably is. The implication 
is that when the economy is manifestly deteriorating, authoritarian incumbents may try 
to use media influence to convince the electorate that the alternatives would be even 
worse.  
 
Economic Voting, Partisanship and the Media: Existing Studies 
To provide tests of the idea of economic voting, the literature conventionally relies on 
surveys asking individual respondents about how they think the economy has performed 
over the past year (retrospective evaluation) and how they expect it to perform during 
the next year (prospective evaluation). The respondents are also asked to evaluate the 
economy from the vantage point of their own household (pocketbook evaluation) as well 
as the national economy in general (sociotropic evaluation). The combination of these 
two pair of options provide a battery of four evaluation measures, which can then be 
used as predictors of the individual’s vote choice for the next election, controlled for 
social class and ideological position. The literature provides strong theoretical and 
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empirical grounds to think that retrospective sociotropic evaluations, especially, are 
significant drivers of the vote choice (Lewis-Beck et al., 2012). 
Against an influential canon of economic voting studies, a revisionist line of 
thinking warns against putting too much faith in the traditional interpretations of 
existing findings (Wleizen, et al., 1997, Evans and Anderson, 2006). These warnings find 
microfoundations in behavioral psychology: People are inclined to minimize cognitive 
dissonance between various beliefs they hold. Therefore, some may develop feelings of 
sympathy for a certain leader or party for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
economy, and then they may derivatively come to believe that economic governance 
under that leader or party has been strong. People also like to take credit for good 
outcomes and avoid blame for bad ones. Therefore, those who already voted for the 
incumbents may come to believe that the economy has been going well (Palmer and 
Duch, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004, Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). In addition to highlighting 
partisan biases, scholars have questioned the normative implications of the economic 
voting hypothesis by pointing to discrepancies between objective economic data (such 
as GDP growth, unemployment or inflation) and voters’ subjective beliefs about the 
economy (Anderson, 2007).  
In this regard, the influence of news media in shaping the voters’ perceptions of 
the economic situation is a frequently commented upon, yet understudied, dimension of 
economic voting. As Healy and Malhotra put it, “The pocketbook voter need only consult 
his bank account; the sociotropic voter can consult the news to assess the health of the 
economy” (2013: 286). The influence of news media can attenuate and reinforce already 
existing partisan biases in how voters evaluate the incumbent economic performance. 
The anti-incumbent bias of those voters traditionally associated with the opposition may 
be attenuated if they happen to be relying on a mostly pro-incumbent media outlet to 
hear the news. When it comes to those who traditionally vote for the incumbents—the 
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same kind of media outlet can help keep them in the pro-incumbent lines even at times 
of economic hardship. 
In this article, we address the role of pro-incumbent media influence over 
economic evaluations based on individual-level data from a competitive authoritarian 
setting. Competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by the presence of the basic 
institutions of electoral democracy and a meaningful degree of competition for power, 
together with a highly uneven competition field favoring the incumbent party/leader 
due to the use of illiberal governance practices (Levitsky and Way, 2010). These practices 
include the harassment of opposition activists, effective abolishment of street protests, 
and maybe most importantly, undue control over news media. In competitive 
authoritarian settings the incumbents can use media influence to bolster the voters’ 
perceptions of the economy and reinforce their electoral appeal (Rozenas and Stukal, 
forthcoming).  
It is fair to call Erdogan’s Turkey a competitive authoritarian regime (Esen and 
Gümüşçü, 2016). Especially since the failed coup attempt of 2016, the government has 
taken authoritarian measures to curb the opposition, taking advantage of a state of 
emergency that lasted about two years. Nonetheless, a vibrant electoral scene is still 
present in Turkey. All major parties take elections seriously and vigorously prepare for 
them. Over several elections, roughly half of the electorate has consistently voted against 
Erdogan and his party AKP. Corresponding to the uneven yet vibrant electoral scene, 
there is rigorous scholarly debate over whether economic voting mechanisms work in 
Turkey (Carkoglu, 2012; Erdoğan, 2013; Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu, 2016; Kalaycıoğlu, 
2017). On the one hand, in the early 2000s Erdogan’s AKP was credited for putting 
Turkey on an economic growth path with low inflation levels that the country had not 
experienced since many decades. This historic achievement is generally regarded as a 
major reason for the party’s enduring electoral appeal. On the other hand, there is the 
impression that a social-cultural divide between pious people, who tend to vote for AKP, 
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and secular people, who tend to vote opposition, is increasingly dominating Turkish 
politics, overshadowing the importance of the economy. The divide is being reflected in 
political polarization between those who support President Erdogan’s increasing 
concentration of power and those who oppose it. Nonetheless, the economy remains 
highly salient in official discourse; in fact, the argument that the country needs greater 
power concentration in order not to backtrack into economic instability is frequently put 
forward within the government circles. At the time of our survey in February 2018, the 
country was experiencing early warnings of imminent economic hardship—debt-financed, 
inflationary GDP growth accompanied by deterioration in exchange rate (Oyvat, 2018), 
a situation that provided room for competing narratives offered by different media 
outlets. 
Palmer and Duch (2001) provide experimental evidence that manipulation of 
media cues changes economic evaluations responses in surveys, but they do not provide 
a test of external validity with real media exposure. The case of Turkey would enable 
us to test hypotheses about the impact of partisan media on economic perceptions. This 
is thanks to the existence of competitive elections, media outlets that can be clearly 
identified as government-supported and having a pro-government bias in their news 
coverage, as well as media outlets who are allowed to articulate views associated with 
the opposition. Perhaps due to the absence of such clearly pro-government media in 
advanced democracies, the issue has not been studied within the standard framework of 
economic voting studies, despite the frequent commentary about the importance of the 
media (Wleizen et al., 1997, Evans and Anderson, 2006). 
In the British context, for example, Sanders and Gavin (2004) examine whether 
the aggregate vote for the incumbent follows the aggregate monthly balance of news 
stories on BBC and ITV news programs. They are not interested in the variation 
between BBC and ITV because there is a high degree of correspondence between their 
coverage of economic views, and both can be trusted to provide “a news service that, in 
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the public interest, is free of party political bias” (p. 1251). Nadeau et al. (2000) similarly 
examine news coverage trends found in seven newspapers, using a measure of general 
economic coverage for all of them combined. Even though Sanders et al. (1993, p. 194) 
note about the British press that “confronted with the same objective economic 
circumstances, certain newspapers consistently contrived to interpret events in a manner 
broadly sympathetic to the government,” they do not utilize this variation as a predictor 
for economic evaluations or vote choice at the individual level.  
For the USA, as Goidel et al. (2010, p. 762) note, there is “a fairly consistent 
body of literature connecting content analysis of economic news coverage with aggregate 
economic expectations, but more limited analyses—both in number and scope— 
capturing the individual dynamics by which economic news coverage influences 
individual economic evaluations.” Among the latter, Hetherington (1996) found that 
media consumption negatively shaped individual voters’ retrospective economic 
assessments, which were in turn significantly related to vote choice in the 1992 
presidential election. However, because the entire US media had a negatively biased 
coverage of the economy under the incumbent president, the study did not examine the 
varying impact of different media sources. Other individual-level studies similarly focus 
on the aggregate or uniform effects of different media sources, rather than their variation 
(Weatherford, 1983; Mutz, 1992; Duch et al., 2000; Ansolabehere et al., 2011; Gerber et 
al., 2009; Hetsroni et al., 2012). Goidel et al. (2010) examine—in Louisiana only—the 
categorical difference between national news and local news belonging to the same 
corporation; the CBS group, and not between sources with different partisan biases. 
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) use variation in the availability of Fox News across towns 
to measure the effect of the channel’s news coverage on the town’s Republican vote 
share, but do not examine economic evaluations.  
In sum, we are not aware of previous studies that examine the influence of 
partisan media on economic perceptions and vote choice based on individual-level data, 
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and Turkey provides a good case to study this question. That economic and political 
perceptions may be influenced by partisan news media is not a counter-intuitive 
expectation, but it is not obviously the case, either. People choose their favorite TV 
channel partly based on their already existing partisan orientations, hence, controlling 
for the latter, TV choice may be an insignificant or weak predictor of current perceptions. 
Also, when pro-government propaganda seen on TV is too over-the-top to pass as a 
neutral depiction of reality, it may become a futile or even counter-productive method 
of affecting the audience’s attitudes.  
In this study we demonstrate that the widely observed “sociotropic voter” can 
also be found in Turkey, and economic perceptions have a basis in objective changes 
experienced by individuals, but media makes a substantial difference in forming these 
perceptions. We argue that media does this by weakening the connections between an 
individual’s personal experience, her perception of the national performance, and her 
view of the imagined alternatives. We demonstrate that in Erdogan’s Turkey, pro-
government media outlets lead their audience to think that the national economy has 
done better compared to their own individual experience; and that it could have 
performed worse under alternative leadership. 
 
Media and Politics in Turkey 
We focus on TV channels as the media of interest because in Turkey this is the only 
way most Turkish citizens access the news.3 Data on media consumption rely on the 
individual respondent’s answer to the following question in our February 2018 survey: 
Which TV channel do you prefer most to view the news? Table 1 below lists the answers 
given by the respondents to the question, together with their ratio in the sample 
                                               
3 A 2016 survey (KONDA 2016) revealed that only 13.3 percent of Turkish households purchase 
newspapers and 39 percent state they read newspapers. Furthermore 72 percent state that they hear the 
news first from the TV and 15 percent use no other news sources (radio, print newspapers, websites or 
online applications) other than TV. 
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expressed in Column I. Column II notes what percentage of the viewers of each channel, 
according to our sample, report to have voted for the incumbents AKP in the last 
national election of November 2015.  
Table 1 Audience composition and political affiliations for TV news in Turkey 
  Survey data Affiliation information 
  
I) Ratio in 
sample 
(%) 
II) Viewers 
who voted 
AKP (%) 
III) Time 
devoted to 
Erdogan or 
AKP (%) 
IV) Ownership as of February 2018 
Don't watch TV news 15.7 20.6 N/A N/A 
A Haber* 8 85.8 81.0 Turkuvaz Medya (Zirve Holding) 
ATV* 14.7 77.7 81.8 Turkuvaz Medya (Zirve Holding) 
CNN Türk 2.5 25 61.1 Doğan Yayın Holding 
Fox TV 21.4 12.9 56.4 Fox International Channels 
Haber Türk 1.2 44.8 65.3 Ciner Medya Grubu 
Halk TV 1.7 2.4 N/A Estetik Yayın A.Ş 
Kanal 7* 1.4 85.3 81.3 Yeni Dünya Medya Grubu 
Kanal D 7.4 36.3 61.7 Doğan Yayın Holding 
NTV 2.2 41.8 76.9 Doğuş Holding 
Show TV 4.1 52.6 67.2 Ciner Medya Grubu 
Star TV 3.7 38.8 66.9 Doğuş Holding 
TRT and TRT Haber* 11.1 72.6 91.2 State agency 
Other channels 4.9 51.4 N/A N/A 
Total 100 44.3   
* Pro-government. Column III reports, based on official RTUK data, minutes devoted to AKP 
representatives in addition to President Erdoğan during the propaganda period before the 2017 
referendum. See Supplementary Appendix A.1 for details. 
 
Unlike the USA, there are no exclusive and competitive cable networks in Turkey 
and all major TV channels can be assumed to be available to be viewed by anyone with 
a TV. Starting with the establishment of private TV channels in the early 1990s, the 
viewership was conventionally considered to differ on the basis of income and education. 
With the growing hegemony of Erdogan’s AKP, however, TV channels have come to be 
identified with their relative political stance towards the government. While every media 
outlet in Turkey has to do business with anticipated government reactions in mind, not 
all do this happily or to an equal extent. We identify four TV channels as pro-
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government media as of February 2018, based on existing literature and a simple content 
analysis.  
Among these four, TRT is Turkey’s public broadcasting institution. TRT was 
often the voice of the bureaucratic-military establishment during when the latter 
controlled the state, and currently it has an unmistakable pro-AKP and pro-Erdogan 
accent, amplified through its exclusively news-oriented outlet TRT Haber. Secondly, 
ATV is Turkey’s most viewed private TV channel, originally founded by secularly 
oriented businessmen. It was sold in 2007 to the pro-AKP business conglomerate Çalık, 
and then in 2014 to another one—Zirve Holding. Both of these acquisitions were visibly 
connected to Erdogan’s increasing influence over the mainstream media: Çalık’s CEO 
was Berat Albayrak, currently Erdogan’s son-in-law and Turkey’s Minister of Finance 
and Treasury. Zirve Holding’s media branch Turkuvaz is managed by Serhat Albayrak—
Berat’s brother; and the holding’s flagship firm Kalyon has become one of the world’s 
top ten infrastructure firms through government contracts under AKP governments.4 
ATV still targets the higher-income, centrist segments of the viewership market with 
attractive gameshows and the like; however, its news coverage has become clearly pro-
government especially in the highly polarized post-2014 period. The third channel we 
identify is A Haber, which is a news-only TV channel that is run under the same Zirve-
Turkuvaz media group. The last channel is the moderately Islamist Kanal 7, which is 
best known for having Zahid Akman as its chief editor. Akman served as the head of 
the RTUK (the public institution for monitoring TV content for compliance with laws) 
under AKP until being involved in a major scandal involving alleged government 
corruption (for a premier to government-media relations in Turkey; see Freedom House, 
2014; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). 
                                               
4 See “Top 10 sponsors by investment and region, 1990-2017” in World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database,  https://ppi.worldbank.org/snapshots/rankings.  
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While to close observers of Turkish politics the political affiliations of TV 
channels may be obvious, they should be best confirmed with systematic content 
analysis. We can do this thanks to an independent research conducted just before the 
last (prior to the survey date) major polarizing political event in the country, the 
referendum held in April 2017 on the transition from a semi-presidential to a fully 
presidential system. For the referendum, President Erdogan and his party AKP 
enthusiastically advocated an affirmative vote, while the other parties remained either 
ambivalent or opposed to the idea. Through content analysis, the research analyzed time 
devoted in news stories to covering the representatives of each party in addition to the 
President Erdogan himself (or his presidential advisors) during a 20-day period in March 
2017.5 The Column III of Table 1 lists time devoted to AKP and President Erdogan as 
a share of total time for all parties in the parliament. The ratio surpasses 80 percent for 
all four TV channels we identify as “pro-government” and for no other channel. News 
coverage is not always in a positive light, so appearance in news may not mean 
endorsement. Alternative information about endorsements may be gleaned from 
decisions about live-broadcasting a speech by a politician or hosting them in live debates. 
Live coverage data (see Supplementary Appendix A.1) confirms the premise: The ratio 
of time devoted to AKP and President Erdogan is above 90 percent for all pro-
government channels and for no other channel. 
In short, there is ample reason to consider those who rely on TRT Haber, ATV, 
A Haber and Kanal 7 as their primary source of news as being exposed to pro-
government media influence. We are interested in whether differential exposure to pro-
government media is associated with differences in individuals’ evaluations of the 
economy and their vote decisions. Ideally, this question would be best investigated in an 
                                               
5 The research was conducted by Ersin Öngel, a board member of RTUK, in cooperation with the NGO 
Demokrasi İçin Birlik, based on official RTUK data. Descriptive tables are available at 
https://bianet.org/english/society/184769-allocation-of-broadcast-time-on-tv-53h-for-erdogan-17h-for-
chp-33-min-for-hdp. See Supplementary Appendix A.1 for details.  
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experimental setting where media exposure could be administered as a random 
treatment. In observational data provided by a survey, the subjects are self-selected into 
viewing certain media. In tackling this issue, our basic assumption is that a latent 
variable that could be called partisan orientation substantially drives TV choice, biases 
economic perceptions, and predicts vote choice for the next election. While it may not 
be possible to fully operationalize this latent orientation, we believe that vote choice 
reported for the last national election would be a good proxy for it, considering the rather 
sclerotic nature of vote blocs in contemporary Turkey. In other words, those who already 
voted for AKP in 2015 will be more likely to believe that the economy has been going 
well, watch pro-government TV channels that tell them the same, and vote again for 
AKP/Erdogan in 2018. For this reason, we control for past vote to test all our 
hypotheses. Furthermore, we utilize instrumental variables and other tests to 
demonstrate the robustness of the results.  
 
Hypotheses 
We set out by recognizing that past partisanship is an important source of bias in the 
formation of economic evaluations as well as future vote choice.  
• H1: Individuals who voted for the incumbent in the last election will have greater 
likelihood to vote for the incumbent again, and also upwardly biased evaluations 
of the economy, compared to everybody else. 
We hypothesize that media influence will have some direct effect on the vote choice.  
• H2: Individuals will be affected by media propaganda in forming their vote 
decisions. Therefore, those who rely on pro-government TV channels as their 
source of news will be more likely to vote for the incumbent, controlled for past 
vote choice. 
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We accept the basic premise of the economic voting hypothesis. People will judge how 
the economy is doing and will reward the incumbents for a favorably judged economic 
record. 
• H3: The more satisfied individuals are with the last year’s national economic 
performance, the more likely they will be to vote for the incumbent, controlled 
for past vote choice. 
Existing literature assumes that a deteriorating economy directly translates to a negative 
score for the incumbents’ performance as viewed by the voters. Differently, we conjecture 
that individuals will evaluate the national economy not only based on whether it has 
improved in an absolute sense but also relative to the counterfactual case of how the 
economy could have done under a different party/leader during the same period. This is 
because, first, the national economy is affected by international developments that are 
not within the government’s control. When global trends go badly, the incumbent may 
be rewarded for a good record in limiting the damage, even if the economy has 
deteriorated in an absolute sense (Duch and Stevenson, 2010; Kayser and Peres, 2012; 
Aytaç, 2018). Secondly, the alternative to keeping the incumbents in place is not going 
back to where things were, but replacing them with the opposition. If the opposition is 
viewed as incompetent, the voters may consider the poor record of the incumbent as a 
relatively good one, compared to the imagined alternative. Therefore, evaluations of 
imagined alternatives favoring the incumbent will increase the likelihood to vote for the 
incumbent. We investigate these evaluations with the following question (counterfactual 
evaluation) in our survey: “How do you think the economy would fare if somebody other 
than Tayyip Erdogan came to power?” with answer options “it would be better” “it 
would be the same” “it would be worse” converted to an ordinal scale 1 to 3 (higher 
values favoring the incumbent).  
• H4: Individuals will evaluate the national economy not only based on whether it 
has improved in an absolute sense but also relative to how the economy could 
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have done under a different party/leader. Therefore, evaluations of counterfactual 
alternatives favoring the incumbent will increase the likelihood to vote for the 
incumbent, controlled for past vote choice. 
This new measure we are introducing would be important in understanding why people 
may keep voting for the incumbent despite apparent dissatisfaction with the economy, 
and how media may play a role in generating this behavior. In contemporary Turkey, 
for example, judging by mean scores for answers given in our survey, the majority thinks 
that the economy has gone down over the last year, at both national and pocketbook 
levels. However, the majority thinks that the national economy has done better than 
their own pocketbook, and a plurality also believes that the national economy would 
have been affected badly (instead of positively or neutrally) by a leader turnover—in 
other words, things could get worse than they already are. H4 tests whether these 
economic perceptions meaningfully relate to voting behavior. Our next hypotheses 
pertain to how the perceptions themselves are formed. We hypothesize that individuals’ 
evaluations of both the actual state of the economy and its imagined alternatives are 
biased by the news media they rely on. 
• H5: Those who rely on pro-government TV channels as their source of news will 
have upwardly biased (relative to everyone else) evaluations of economic 
performance, controlled for past vote choice. 
While biased by partisanship and exposure to pro-government media, individuals’ 
evaluation of government economic performance is also materially anchored on their own 
daily experience (Tilley et al., 2018; Becher and Donnelly, 2013; Nadeau et al., 2012). 
Those who have experienced recent increases in income, for example, should have more 
positive evaluations of how government policy affects the economy. We expect this 
association to vary in a particular way: The more remote the economic evaluation 
measure is from individual experience, the weaker should be the material anchor, and 
stronger should be media influence. To partially test this hypothesis we will use a 
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measure of real income growth from a “pseudo-panel” generated by sampling Turkey’s 
adult population monthly with a uniform methodology over a period of two years, as 
explained in detail in the data and analysis section. 
• H6: Controlling for past vote, the association with real income growth should be 
stronger for pocketbook evaluations, and weaker for other measures of economic 
evaluation. Conversely, media influence over economic evaluations should be the 
weakest for pocketbook evaluations, stronger for sociotropic evaluations, and 
strongest for counterfactual evaluations. 
As noted above, we already control for past partisanship in an effort to tackle questions 
of endogeneity. The last hypothesis we introduced gives us additional leverage on that 
front because we predict a particular pattern of variation for theoretically sound reasons. 
Had the association between pro-government media exposure and favorable evaluations 
been spurious or generated by reverse causation, we should not be seeing such variance 
between different kinds of evaluations. Furthermore, we develop two further tests of bias 
introduced by media. We set out from the assumption that, to judge how the national 
economy would perform under alternative political leadership, the citizens have to rely 
on their knowledge of how the economy actually performed recently. And to judge actual 
national economic performance, the citizens have to rely on their personal experience 
(Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997). Discrepancies between these judgments and their 
respective benchmarks can be explained by reliance on external sources of information 
such as news media. The discrepancies therefore should be greater for viewers of pro-
government TV. 
• H7: The positive difference between sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations will 
be greater for viewers of pro-government TV (the “sociotropic overestimation” 
bias). 
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• H8: Counterfactual evaluations will have a weaker association with retrospective 
evaluations for viewers of pro-government TV (the “counterfactual 
rationalization” bias). 
In the first part that follows, we undertake estimates of the vote choice, and the role 
played by economic evaluations in it, testing H1 to H4. Next, we analyze the formation 
of economic evaluations, testing H5 to H8. Lastly, we employ instrumental variable 
approach to provide more robust evidence on the working of the economic voting 
mechanism.  
 
Survey Data  
Our survey was conducted in February 2018 with face-to-face interviews with 2687 
respondents in a stratified selection of 154 neighborhoods and villages in 101 districts of 
30 provinces in 12 socioeconomic regions of Turkey. Assuming a representative sample, 
it has a 1.7 margin of error with 95% confidence (Supplementary Appendix A.2 for 
details). In our analyses we cluster standard errors at the province level. 
The outcome variable of interest is the survey respondent’s intended vote for the 
next national election. As national elections go, Turkey has been in a period of transition 
over the last few years. At the time of our survey Turkey was expecting to have 
parliamentary elections (where the vote is for a closed party list, proportional 
representation) as well as its first ever executive presidential election (where the vote is 
for individual leaders, with a possible run-off second round) conducted at the same time. 
An argument could be made for focusing on either vote as our outcome of interest. We 
asked the respondents about both: Which party would you vote for if there was a 
Parliamentary election tomorrow? and Which leader would you vote for if there was a 
Presidential election tomorrow? both coded 1 for the incumbent as against everyone else 
(including the undecided). 
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Viewers of four government-connected TV channels are coded 1 for pro-
government media and everyone else 0. Respondents who claim not watching TV news 
disproportionately include ethnic minorities, who were probably uncomfortable with 
disclosing the TV channels they watch, since ethnically-oriented TV channels are 
controversial in Turkey. We therefore pool them with non-government TV viewers. 
(Moreover, if we code these two categories separately, the results remain unchanged).  
The economic perception measures we utilize include the battery of four questions 
conventionally found in the literature. Our hypotheses about how the citizens evaluate 
actual performance pertain to retrospective measures but we also include prospective 
ones in our analyses to show how our findings compare with previous findings. We also 
introduce a new measure—the counterfactual evaluation of how the economy would 
perform if the incumbent was replaced. This measure could be preferred to have the 
same 5-level answer scale used for the conventional measures. However, after pretests of 
survey implementation we decided to simplify the answer scale for easier comprehension 
and so asked the respondents to choose from three responses, “1=it would improve,” 
“2=it would remain the same,” “3=it would deteriorate.”  
The literature includes examples where the four conventional evaluations are 
inserted into regressions in alteration, simultaneously or as an index. In our estimations, 
we take an inductive approach and report findings from several strategies, including one 
with a factor index. The factor analysis between the four standard measures and the 
newly introduced one reveals that the latter relates to a dimension of voter perceptions 
that is not captured by existing economic evaluation measures. To generate a factor 
index, using the principal-component method, we therefore use the four standard 
measures. This variable is called as the index of economic perceptions. 
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Table 2 Factor analysis of economic evaluation measures 
Measure Wording Loading Uniqueness 
Retrospective 
pocketbook 
How well your household economy has been affected 
by the government’s policies over the last year?  0.811 0.343 
Retrospective 
sociotropic 
How well the national economy has been affected by 
the government’s policies over the last year?  0.840 0.294 
Prospective 
pocketbook  
How do you expect your household economy to be 
affected by the government’s policies during next year? 0.870 0.243 
Prospective 
sociotropic 
How do you expect the national economy to be 
affected by the government’s policies during next year? 0.870 0.242 
Counterfactual  How do you think the economy would fare if someone 
other than Erdogan came to power?  
0.502 0.748 
Notes: Analysis is based on one factor that satisfies the “Kaiser criterion” (Eigenvalue of 3.13>1). 
We expect all these measures to be predictors of the vote intention for the 
incumbent. We also expect them to be positively correlated with pro-government TV 
viewership.  
For retrospective measures, we subtract the respondent’s pocketbook score from 
his sociotropic score, and thus arrive at sociotropic overestimation ranging from -2 to 4 
(a greater range is possible but not observed in the sample). Greater the values, the 
more likely the respondent is to think that the national economy has done well despite 
her own household experience to the contrary, and we expect this value to be positively 
associated with pro-government TV viewership. 
A last economic perception measure comes from the consideration that the 
measures we have used so far connote to a valence judgment about the performance of 
the government, raising the possibility that the respondents may tailor their answers on 
the basis of their wider view of the incumbent. An alternative strategy is asking an open-
ended question about the economy that includes no cues of government responsibility 
and no benchmark associated with a “desirable” answer. So we asked the respondents: 
“Say you were paying 100 kurus for an item a year ago, how much in average are you 
paying for it now?” The answers give us the respondents’ own perceptions about the 
price index—something that macro-level research found to be a good predictor of 
incumbent vote share in Turkish elections (Akarca and Tansel 2006).  
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Table 3: Summary statistics for economic perception measures 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Retrospective pocketbook 2,641 2.421 0.933 1 5 
Retrospective sociotropic 2,611 2.531 1.045 1 5 
Prospective pocketbook 2,562 2.625 0.985 1 5 
Prospective sociotropic 2,552 2.666 1.06 1 5 
Index of econ evaluations 2529 0 0.953 -1.665 2.578 
Counterfactual evaluation 2,491 2.179 0.801 1 3 
Sociotropic overestimation 2,608 0.108 0.721 -2 4 
Perceived price index 2,508 155.4 112 70 2750 
 
We utilize a number of control variables. These include sex, curvilinear measures 
of age, 4 categories of education attainment (primary school or lower, secondary school, 
high school, university or higher), self-placement on a 1-5 scale of religiosity, self-
placement on a 1-10 scale of left-right ideology, respondent location categorically in 
terms of rural, urban and metropolitan settlements. To account for the confessional and 
ethnic cleavages in Turkey, we distinguish between Sunni Muslims and everyone else; as 
well as Kurds and everyone else. To control for income level, following established OECD 
(2011) methodology, we divide household income by the square root of the number of 
people living in the household—to adjust for economies of scale in consumption. In our 
estimations, as common we will take the natural logarithm of this value to adjust for 
the high level of skewedness (and drop zero values). Lastly, we control for past vote. 
Those who voted for AKP in the last Parliamentary election of November 2015 are coded 
1 and everyone else as 0—for up until now the Parliamentary election was the only 
election that directly mattered for the composition of the executive power. (We also 
replicated our analyses by inserting dummies for past vote for each major party in 
Turkey, main results remaining the same).  
Among sample respondents who were at voting age and who claim to have voted 
in the November 2015 election, 51.3 percent report as having voted for AKP. This 
compares well with the actual share of AKP votes within all votes cast in that election: 
48.8 percent. However, because our estimations use a large number of variables and we 
 19 
utilize listwise deletion for missing values, it is inescapable that many observations will 
be lost. A test of randomness for deletion is in order. For this purpose, we take the model 
6 from Table 4 that utilizes the smallest sample (N=1762) as a benchmark and test 
whether any variables differ significantly between utilized and deleted observations, since 
this could potentially bias our estimation results. It turns out that survey respondents 
that are dropped from the analysis due to missing answers are slightly older, 
disproportionately female and somewhat less educated. This could be cause of concern 
if other variables like media choice, economic perceptions and vote decisions also differed 
significantly between the samples, but none do. Hence, our effective sample should be 
considered to have high validity.  
 
Estimating Vote Choice 
We start our analysis with Table 4, estimating probit models of vote choice predicted 
by economic evaluation measures and pro-government media viewership in addition to 
demographic control variables, both for Parliamentary (Models 1-4) and Presidential 
elections (5-8). We start with models that do not include a measure of previous 
partisanship (models 1 and 5)—these estimations classify 84-85 percent of the 
observations correctly, compared to 39 and 43 percent for AKP and Erdogan, 
respectively, that we would obtain by chance if we did not have a predictive model. We 
then add past AKP vote as a control variable, which boosts correct classifications to 
about 89 percent. These models can be considered to predict vote updating for 
respondents whose previous vote we know. All in all, the only variables that consistently 
pass the significance test for both vote decisions regardless of model specification are 
left-right self-placement, having a university degree, pro-government media viewership, 
and certain measures of economic evaluation.  
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Table 4 Probit estimates of the incumbent vote 
 Voting for AKP Voting for Erdogan 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Controls 
Female 0.148* 0.045 0.046 0.041 0.015 -0.099 -0.095 -0.081 
 (0.081) (0.099) (0.096) (0.097) (0.085) (0.098) (0.098) (0.090) 
Age 0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.037* 0.037** -0.015 -0.013 -0.020 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Age squared -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kurd -0.023 0.022 0.017 -0.038 -0.098 -0.047 -0.043 -0.086 
 (0.127) (0.106) (0.110) (0.110) (0.132) (0.152) (0.151) (0.143) 
Sunni 0.499* 0.311 0.321 0.171 0.718*** 0.657** 0.657** 0.432 
 (0.297) (0.322) (0.318) (0.277) (0.252) (0.303) (0.302) (0.267) 
Mid-school 0.087 0.010 0.019 0.029 0.216* 0.167 0.165 0.136 
 (0.138) (0.157) (0.158) (0.147) (0.118) (0.138) (0.137) (0.127) 
High-school -0.018 0.025 0.016 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 0.005 
 (0.102) (0.096) (0.096) (0.099) (0.124) (0.143) (0.143) (0.133) 
University -0.387*** -0.330** -0.332** -0.352** -0.581*** -0.557*** -0.553*** -0.504*** 
 (0.142) (0.150) (0.145) (0.142) (0.152) (0.175) (0.174) (0.163) 
Log. income -0.073 -0.057 -0.048 -0.057 0.071 0.124 0.115 0.088 
 (0.066) (0.080) (0.078) (0.072) (0.075) (0.085) (0.084) (0.079) 
Religiosity 0.176** 0.101 0.100 0.123 0.174** 0.082 0.080 0.129* 
 (0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.071) (0.079) (0.079) (0.074) 
Urban -0.068 -0.018 -0.014 0.035 0.101 0.234 0.231 0.257* 
 (0.189) (0.256) (0.253) (0.259) (0.134) (0.152) (0.152) (0.140) 
Metropole -0.094 -0.159 -0.165 -0.116 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.030 
 (0.163) (0.223) (0.222) (0.234) (0.129) (0.145) (0.145) (0.132) 
Left-right 0.105*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.121*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.112*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Past AKP  1.708*** 1.708*** 1.837***  1.665*** 1.660*** 1.787*** 
  (0.113) (0.112) (0.114)  (0.104) (0.103) (0.096) 
Main Predictors 
Pro-govt 
TV 
0.786*** 0.525*** 0.522*** 0.558*** 0.650*** 0.318*** 0.322*** 0.405*** 
 (0.087) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095) (0.088) (0.104) (0.104) (0.097) 
Retro. pock. 0.179*** 0.175**   0.080 0.015   
 (0.061) (0.068)   (0.068) (0.078)   
Retro. socio. 0.200*** 0.150***   0.232*** 0.218***   
 (0.058) (0.053)   (0.062) (0.070)   
Pros. pock. 0.125** 0.092   0.201*** 0.199**   
 (0.059) (0.068)   (0.076) (0.087)   
Pros. socio. 0.110 0.064   0.156** 0.086   
 (0.071) (0.077)   (0.069) (0.080)   
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Table 4 (continued) Probit estimates of the incumbent vote 
 Voting for AKP Voting for Erdogan 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Counterfac. 0.532*** 0.344*** 0.350***  0.792*** 0.678*** 0.680***  
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.074)  (0.062) (0.071) (0.071)  
Index econ   0.438*** 0.487***   0.499*** 0.565*** 
   (0.072) (0.067)   (0.061) (0.056) 
constant -5.187*** -3.361*** -2.199*** -1.310* -7.181*** -5.744*** -4.371*** -2.805*** 
 (0.698) (0.659) (0.619) (0.681) (0.745) (0.827) (0.815) (0.743) 
N 1,828 1,789 1,789 1,864 1,799 1,762 1,762 1,836 
McFad.’s R2 0.444 0.581 0.580 0.572 0.506 0.626 0.625 0.582 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 Three findings deserve attention here. First, models 1 and 5 indicate that being 
more religious is associated with a higher probability to vote for both AKP and Erdogan. 
However, some measures of economic evaluation have stronger coefficients in 
comparison, and religiosity loses significance once we control for past vote. In other 
words, even though AKP’s core following have disproportionately come from the ranks 
of the pious (which is accounted for by the past vote); perceptions of economic 
performance make a significant difference in convincing additional groups to update their 
vote and winning a majority.  
The second finding is about how different measures of economic evaluation 
perform. When all measures are used together, it is the retrospective sociotropic and the 
counterfactual evaluations that are significant and strong predictors of the vote choice 
regardless of model specification, however, the counterfactual is the more robust one 
among the two.6 In alternative specifications we also ran models (see Supplementary 
Appendix B.1) that include a single economic measure, trying each of the alternative 
measures in turn. Each measure is individually significant and substantial, while greatest 
                                               
6 When we keep these two only and drop other measures: the coefficients for the sociotropic swells 
considerably by absorbing their omitted influences on the outcome, however the coefficient of the 
“counterfactual” evaluation remains remarkably robust. Detailed results can be found in the 
Supplementary Appendix B.2. 
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effects come from the counterfactual.7 In short, Turkish voters in our sample seem to 
behave in accordance with the well-established retrospective sociotropic voter 
paradigm—they have greater probability to vote for the incumbents if they think that 
the national economy has fared well over the last year. However, the evaluation of what 
would happen to the economy if the incumbent was replaced (the “counterfactual” 
measure we are introducing in this article) proves to be an even stronger and more 
robust predictor of the vote choice than this commonly used measure of economic 
evaluation. 
Thirdly, pro-government media viewership is a strong predictor of the vote choice 
(even when we control for past partisanship, which should be affecting how people choose 
the TV channel to follow for the news). Figure 1 shows how the probability to vote for 
the incumbent varies with different values of the standard economic perceptions index, 
while providing a comparison of pro-government TV viewers and everyone else.  
                                               
7 Because different measures have different ordinal scales, we cannot directly compare the reported 
coefficients but we can compare the change in the dependent variable associated with one standard 
deviation unit change in each. According to Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), models built on the new 
measure outperform alternative models especially for estimating the vote for Erdogan. The same 
information criteria also reveal that replacing the four standard measures with the factor index improves 
model performance. See Supplementary Appendix B.2. 
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Figure 1: Predicted probability for incumbent vote, controlling for past vote 
(generated from models 4 and 8) 
 
But how are the economic perceptions formed, and how are they influenced, in 
turn, by exposure to pro-government media? This is the issue we turn to next.  
 
Formation of Economic Perceptions 
A starting point for this exercise would be significance tests of the differences in economic 
perceptions between those who rely on pro-government TV channels for news and the 
rest. This is what we do in Table 5. In each case, we divide the sample between those 
who voted for the current incumbents in the last election and those who did not. As 
expected, pro-government media viewership is associated with significantly more 
favorable perceptions and lower perceived price levels across both partisanship groups.8 
The last row introduces the variable sociotropic overestimation. The greater the values, 
                                               
8 For the price level, we decided to exclude 13 outlying observations that pointed to at least 1000 percent 
price inflation. (Official annual rate for 2017 was 12 percent). 
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the more likely the respondent is to think that the national economy has done well 
despite his own experience to the contrary, which suggests influence by authoritative 
information sources like the media. Interestingly, differences between different media 
group viewers are significant only among non-past AKP voters for this variable. 
 
Table 5 Test of significance for difference in economic evaluation scores across media 
viewership and past partisanship 
    
Pro-govt 
TV 
Other or 
no TV 
Difference N 
Retrospective pocketbook Past AKP voters 2.97 2.69 0.28*** 1052 
(1 to 5) Others 2.45 2.01 0.44*** 1323 
Retrospective sociotropic Past AKP voters 3.22 2.87 0.35*** 1038 
(1 to 5) Others 2.58 2.01 0.57*** 1315 
Counterfactual evaluation Past AKP voters 2.74 2.5 0.23*** 1007 
(1 to 3) Others 2.17 1.74 0.42*** 1256 
Prospective pocketbook Past AKP voters 3.23 2.93 0.31*** 1018 
(1 to 5) Others 2.69 2.16 0.54*** 1298 
Prospective sociotropic Past AKP voters 3.36 3.02 0.34*** 1013 
(1 to 5) Others 2.75 2.14 0.61*** 1297 
Perceived price index (%) 
Past AKP voters 136 144 -8*** 996 
Others 150 157 -7* 1270 
Sociotropic overestimation  Past AKP voters 0.24 0.18 0.06 1037 
(-2 to 4) Others 0.13 0 0.13*** 1313 
Notes: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 for one tailed differences 
 
While pro-government media viewership is an important source of bias in the 
formation of economic perceptions, we also believe that the latter has a material basis 
in how citizens’ real incomes change. We do not have panel data where we can trace 
changes in respondents’ income levels. However, we can generate predicted income 
changes for each individual by exploiting a pseudo panel of Turkish voters surveyed 
monthly by the same research company (KONDA), based on the same sample selection 
and survey methodology over a period of two years (a database utilized in somewhat 
similar fashion by Marschall et al., 2016). This is a series of surveys from which we also 
obtain the February 2018 data examined so far. Now, our strategy is first pooling 
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reported household income for the entire pseudo panel, adjusting them for monthly 
inflation, regressing income on certain demographic characteristics, thus arriving at 
predicted real income for various demographic groups, and secondly, generating 
predicted real income growth for these groups for a given period of interest.9 We will 
then see whether economic perceptions in February 2018 had a meaningful relationship 
with this proxy measure of real income growth over the previous period. 
For this purpose, first, for the given period (t), we predict the logarithms of 
incomes (log(y)) of each group (i) by OLS regressions in the following form: log	(𝑦)( )* = 𝛽- + 𝛽/𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)* + 𝛽6𝑒𝑑𝑢)* + 𝛽9𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑)* + 𝛽;𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)* + 𝛽<𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝)* + 𝜀)* 
where region is the respondent’s location in one of Turkey’s seven geographical regions, 
edu is the level of education (primary school & no degree, middle school, high school, 
university), resid is the type of residential area (rural, urban, metropolitan), and occup 
is occupation (capitalist/white collar, worker/artisan/farmer, retired, housewife, 
student, unemployed). The Pearson correlation coefficient between our predicted group 
incomes and household incomes in February 2018 is 0.447. 
Next, we take the logarithm of the predicted incomes of each group using natural 
logarithmic conversion. Last, we estimate the one-year growth in incomes of each group.  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ1) = 𝑦D)* − 𝑦D)*F/𝑦D)*F/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 As in the rest of the article we use household income adjusted for OECD’s square root scale for predicting 
income growth rates of each group. Moreover, the household incomes (y) in OLS regressions for all months 
are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for February 2018 as the base month. See 
Supplementary Appendix A.3. 
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Table 6 Estimates of respondents’ economic evaluation scores   
Ordered probit OLS 
 Retro. 
pocket. 
Retro. 
socio. 
Counter. 
evaluat. 
Prospec. 
pocket. 
Prospec. 
socio. 
Socio. 
overest. 
Log of 
prices 
Highlighted controls (see Table 4 for full list) 
Log. income 0.179*** 0.072 0.061 0.119* 0.029 -0.118** -0.052*** 
 (0.067) (0.061) (0.038) (0.064) (0.065) (0.050) (0.017) 
Past AKP 0.641*** 0.697*** 0.881*** 0.643*** 0.685*** 0.180*** -0.081*** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.092) (0.084) (0.082) (0.066) (0.016) 
Left-right 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.115*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.002 -0.012*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) 
Main predictors 
Pro-govt. TV 0.334*** 0.410*** 0.482*** 0.419*** 0.398*** 0.134** -0.041* 
 (0.056) (0.067) (0.097) (0.078) (0.066) (0.068) (0.022) 
Income growth 0.010** 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 0.009** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 
Intercept Multiple cut-offs  5.392*** 
       (0.11) 
N 1,918 1,903 1,845 1,831 1,876 1,901 1,858 
McFad.’s R2 0.115 0.126 0.193 0.166 0.125 0.016 0.069 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
We thus generate simulated one-year individual income growth, to use as a proxy 
of real economic change experienced by the respondents.10 In Table 6, we show 
multivariate estimates of February 2018 economic perceptions, including this simulated 
growth proxy among the predictors in addition to the full set of controls utilized earlier 
for the estimation of the vote choice. The income growth rate turns out to be a significant 
determinant of the standard perception measures while failing to attain significance for 
the other measures. Controlled for the income growth proxy, pro-government media 
viewership is still associated with more favorable economic assessments, lower perceived 
price levels,11 and higher likelihoods of sociotropic overestimation, confirming H5 and 
                                               
10 To generate more accurate coefficients for this regression, we enlarge the income sample by using two-
month periods as our interval. Hence, the predicted group incomes for our current period are estimated 
using pooled data from two monthly surveys for the January 2018- February 2018 period, and for the one-
year lag we use data from two surveys for January 2017 and February 2017. See Supplementary Appendix 
A.3 for details. 
11 To undertake an OLS estimation of the perceived price levels, this time we include all available 
observations but take the natural logarithm of the values. 
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H7. When we separate past-AKP voters and everyone else (not shown), media effects 
are successfully replicated for both subsets on all variables, except for price levels—for 
which media effect attains statistical significance for the entire sample only. 
In addition, there is a strong positive association between pro-government TV 
viewership and counterfactual evaluations, and it does not disappear when we include 
retrospective sociotropic evaluation among the control variables, as shown in Table 7 
below. Regardless of how they view actual economic performance, the audience of pro-
government TV are more likely to think that it could be worse under alternative 
leadership. Another way to articulate this phenomenon is that, while there is a 
theoretically expected positive association between the counterfactual and retrospective 
evaluations, the association is substantially weaker for the subset of pro-government TV 
viewers. In other words, while individuals tend to base their view of imagined 
alternatives on their own judgment of actual economic performance, viewers of pro-
government TV do this to a lesser extent, as we predicted in H8.  
 
Table 7: Counterfactual rationalization across media audience groups 
Ordered probit analysis of counterfactual evaluations 
 Full sample Viewers of 
pro-govt TV 
Everyone else 
Highlighted controls  (see Table 4 for full list) 
Left-right 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.019) 
Past AKP voter 0.738*** 0.764*** 0.697*** 
 (0.082) (0.140) (0.098) 
Main predictors    
Pro-govt. TV 0.392***   
 (0.098)   
Income growth 0.003 0.024*** -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Retrospective sociotropic 0.304*** 0.203*** 0.363*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.062) 
N 1,823 634 1,189 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of economic evaluations, controlling for past vote 
and income growth proxy. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of observing 
each value (shown in the x-axis) of the economic perception measure named, based on 
the regression analyses found in Table 6. 
 
Moving on, in H6 we predicted that the effect of pro-government media exposure 
on political views will be stronger the more remote the question is to the individual’s 
actual daily experience. The effect should be smaller for the pocketbook, which people 
can directly experience, and larger for the national economy, for which people would 
have to rely more on what they learn from the media. The effect should be the largest 
when it comes to considering what would happen to the national economy if the 
incumbent was replaced because it requires hypothetical thinking about the competence 
of opposition leaders who have never assumed office. Judging by coefficients for media 
across the models (and normalizing their effects in terms of 1 standard deviation change 
in the outcomes, see Supplementary Appendix B.2), these expectations are confirmed if 
we exclude the prospective measures from the picture. This partial support for our 
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hypothesis is not altogether surprising: Prospective evaluations are often incoherent and 
unstable (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). The literature provides stronger grounds for 
understanding where retrospective evaluations come from—after all they relate to a time 
period that has actually been experienced (Healy and Malhotra 2013, Funk and García-
Monet 1997). In any case, the media effect is substantially the largest when it comes to 
the evaluation of counterfactual alternatives. In Figure 2 the predicted probabilities for 
selected economic evaluation measures are illustrated for viewers of different TVs (when 
all other variables are held at mean, based on table 6). It shows that the differences 
between viewers of pro-government TV and everyone else become more substantial from 
pocketbook to sociotropic and then to counterfactual evaluations.  
All in all, various kinds of evidence suggest that pro-government media 
viewership weakens the connections between how an individual perceives her own 
pocketbook, the national economic performance, and the attractiveness of imagined 
alternatives. 
 
Instrumental Regression Analysis for Vote Decisions 
It is well known that there may be causal influence of the vote decision on economic 
perceptions, generating an endogeneity problem when one estimates the former as an 
outcome of the latter. So far we addressed this issue by controlling for past vote. In this 
section, we further tackle endogeneity with an instrumental variable (IV) approach, by 
instrumenting favorable economic perceptions with our predicted group income growth 
variable. Income growth can be exploited for IV analysis, since it cannot possibly be 
influenced by the respondent’s 2018 vote decision, and it is also a good predictor of 
economic evaluations. In the first stage of our IV regression, we estimate favorable 
economic perceptions (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛G) with the following OLS regression12  
                                               
12 Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have shown that the bias with regard to the direction and 
significance from using OLS in place of an ordered probit estimation is negligibly small. We repeated the 
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𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛)G = 𝛼- + 𝛼/𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) +I𝛼J)𝑋J) + 𝜀)LJM6  
where 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛G is the preferred economic perception index, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is our predicted income 
growth for the group that the individual belongs to, and  𝑋J is the set of control variables 
including the logarithm of adjusted household income and the pro-government media 
dummy. The second stage consists of a probit regression estimating vote decision, in the 
following form: 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡)∗ = 𝛽- + 𝛽/𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛Q)G +I𝛽J)𝑋J) + 𝜀)LJM/  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡)∗ > 0} 
where 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛QG is the economic perception index predicted in the first stage, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 is 
the intention to vote for the incumbent and 𝑋J is the same set of control variables in 
the first stage.  
To check whether an instrumental analysis would indeed be methodologically 
justified for the outcomes of interest, we run Wald tests of exogeneity. For the 
parliamentary (AKP) vote, Wald tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity at far from conservative levels. Therefore, simple probit estimations of the 
AKP vote are probably more efficient than instrumental analysis, which we therefore 
abandon. For the presidential (Erdogan) vote, Wald tests suggest that an endogeneity 
bias exists at 1% significance level for economic evaluation variables (except for the 
counterfactual evaluation, which displays weaker endogeneity). Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic show that our instrument—predicted income growth rate—is not 
underidentified, at 1% significance level. Moreover, for retrospective pocketbook 
evaluation, prospective sociotropic evaluation and index of economic evaluations, 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics are larger than the critical values of the Stock–
Yogo weak ID test at the 20% maximal size, indicating a strong instrument for these 
                                               
analyses with the bioprobit package, which allows the first stage of the instrumental analysis to be 
administered as an ordinal probit (Sajaia 2008). The results are indeed substantially the same. 
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variables. For the counterfactual evaluation, income growth proves to be a weak 
instrument, echoing findings presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 8 IV-Probit estimates for the voting intention for Tayyip Erdoğan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrumented variable       
Retrospective pocketbook  1.291***      
 (0.071)      
Retrospective sociotropic   1.227***     
  (0.025)     
Prospective pocketbook    1.271***    
   (0.039)    
Prospective sociotropic     1.190***   
    (0.053)   
Counterfactual evaluation     1.638 ***  
     (0.111)  
Index of econ evaluations      1.436*** 
      (0.055) 
Highlighted controls (see Table 4 for full list) 
Past AKP voter 0.318 -0.098 -0.022 0.164 -0.528 0.057 
 (0.407) (0.315) (0.341) (0.354) (0.416) (0.358) 
Pro-government TV -0.044 -0.287** -0.230* -0.151 -0.300 -0.238* 
 (0.142) (0.109) (0.132) (0.132) (0.172) (0.131) 
First stage for the instrumented variable 
Income growth (1 year) 0.008** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.002 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Pro-government TV 0.259*** 0.363*** 0.340*** 0.352*** 0.251*** 0.351*** 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.064) (0.053) (0.051) (0.055) 
Wald test (p-value) 0.0013 0.0009 0.0006 0.0005 0.0633 0.0004 
Kleibergen-Paap LM 
statistic 
0.0005 0.0250 0.0143 0.0031 0.2652 0.0013 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 11.889 4.948 5.843 8.653 1.213 10.277 
Log pseudolikelihood -2807.6 -2936.1 -2827.4 -2931.7 -2292.0 -2600.6 
N 1,882 1,867 1,846 1,841 1,810 1,828 
Notes: Province-level clustered standard errors reported in parenthesis. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Stock-
Yogo weak ID critical test values are 16.38 for a 0.1 maximal IV size, 8.96 for a 0.15 maximal IV size, 6.66 for a 0.2 
maximal IV size, and 5.53 for 0.25 maximal IV size. IV Probit estimations include all control variables in Table 4. 
 
Table 8 shows IV-probit estimations of the vote intention for Erdogan. Economic 
perceptions are strong predictors of the outcome. Moreover, predicted income growth is 
a significant predictor at the first stage for the standard measures of economic 
perception, whereas pro-government TV viewership is significant for all measures 
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including the counterfactual. These results suggest that both real changes in economic 
conditions and partisan media affect voting intention by shaping economic perceptions. 
 
Table 9 Marginal effects of predictor variables on probability to vote for Erdoğan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Marginal effects for the second stage 
Retrospective pocketbook  1.291      
Retrospective sociotropic   1.227     
Prospective pocketbook    1.271    
Prospective sociotropic     1.190   
Index of economic 
evaluations 
    1.436 
Pro-government TV -0.044 -0.251 -0.230 -0.151 -0.238 
First stage coefficients 
Income growth (1 year) 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 
Pro-government TV 0.259 0.363 0.340 0.352 0.351 
Total marginal effects 
1% extra income growth 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.010 
Pro-govt TV viewership 0.291 0.194 0.202 0.268 0.267 
Notes: Based on estimations in Table 8. The total marginal effect for the impact of 1% extra growth is (first-stage 
coefficient for income growth*second stage marginal effect for the economic evaluation variable). The total marginal 
effect for the impact of pro-government media is (first-stage coefficient for pro-government media*second stage 
marginal effect for the economic evaluation variable + second-stage marginal effect for pro-government media).  
 
The second stage of the instrumental variable analysis produce unexpected signs 
for the direct effects of both pro-government media and religiosity (and past vote, in 
some models) on the vote for Erdogan. This is a mathematical artifact of the two-stages 
estimation technique and should not be interpreted independently from what goes in the 
first stage: Hernan and Robins (2017) explain that when there is a smaller causal effect 
of the instrument on the endogenous regressor relative to the effect on the same by an 
exogenous variable, the coefficient for the latter may be biased to estimate below its true 
(direct) causal effect, possibly into switching signs. This is the case here. Because 
religiosity and pro-government media have stronger effects on economic perceptions than 
the instrument does (the first stage), their influences on the vote choice are absorbed by 
instrumentalized economic perceptions (the second stage), turning the coefficients for 
direct effects to negative. In other words, while the predicted income growth instrument 
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we construct from limited data performs surprisingly well in predicting economic 
perceptions, it is not strong enough to produce straightforward findings regarding the 
effect of the non-instrumented variables in a second stage where we estimate vote choice.  
In Table 9, using the estimations in Table 8, we show the marginal effects of our 
economic evaluation variables and predict the effects of pro-government media 
viewership and 1 percent difference in income growth on the probability of voting for 
Erdoğan, while holding other variables at their mean.13 In sum, pro-government media 
viewership would increase the probability of voting for Erdoğan between 20.2% and 
29.1% and 1% extra growth in individual’s predicted group income (compared to other 
groups) would increase the probability by between 0.7% and 1%. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In most settings we know of, favorable perceptions about economic performance increase 
the likelihood that a citizen will vote for the incumbent (Lewis-Beck and Stegmeier, 
2000). In this article we analyzed how these perceptions are formed, utilizing data from 
the competitive authoritarian case of Turkey. We tested whether citizens who watch 
pro-government TV channels for accessing the news have significantly higher evaluations 
of government economic performance. In the absence of experimental treatment, 
reported TV choice might be endogenous to the respondent’s political orientation. To 
tackle this problem, we controlled for an extensive list of demographic variables in 
addition to the respondent’s vote in the last national election, which can be considered 
to effectively absorb political orientation. In addition, to investigate whether economic 
evaluations can be decomposed into real and perceived components, we simulated income 
growth based on data from income changes over a two-year period derived from a pseudo 
panel (different samples of Turkish voters repeatedly surveyed using the same 
                                               
13 IV Probit estimates with counterfactual evaluation are excluded from this analysis as growth variables 
are weak instruments for counterfactual evaluation. 
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methodology) to test whether the simulated proxy for income growth predicts how 
respondents evaluate the economy. Our most confident results point to three findings: 
First, even in a setting like Turkey where the electorate is highly polarized on 
socio-cultural grounds, economic motivations are important for the vote decision. 
Holding past partisanship and demographic differences like religiosity constant, voters 
are strongly more disposed to vote for the incumbent leader/party if they believe that 
the economy has been going well, and if they believe that the economy would be badly 
affected by replacing the incumbent.  
Secondly, we demonstrate that, controlled for past partisanship, favorable 
economic perceptions can be predicted by a measure of real income growth, echoing 
previous findings from comparative data (Nadeau et al., 2012). We exploit this finding 
to utilize an instrumental variable approach to estimate vote decisions, to tackle issues 
of endogeneity. We instrument economic perceptions on a proxy measure of the 
respondents’ real income growth rate over the last year and demonstrate that income 
growth affects the likelihood to vote for Erdogan by generating favorable economic 
perceptions. In short, the association between economic perceptions and vote intention 
is not merely an artefact of partisan bias, and instead has an independent effect on vote 
decision as well as a real material basis.  
Third, nonetheless, watching the news on pro-government TV channels makes 
economic perceptions substantially more favorable, again controlling for past 
partisanship and regardless of whether real income growth is accounted for. This holds 
for questions with an explicit government responsibility component as well as an open-
ended question that investigates—with no political cues or suggestive benchmark—the 
respondent’s perceived price inflation rate. Viewing pro-government media also makes 
respondents more likely to think that the national economy has done better than their 
own household, a situation that we call “sociotropic overestimation.” In addition, 
regardless of how they view actual economic performance, the audience of pro-
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government TV are more likely to think that it could be worse under alternative 
leadership—a situation of “counterfactual rationalization.” Strikingly, among all 
measures of economic perception, the respondent’s evaluation of the counterfactual 
alternative is the one with the weakest connection to some real measure of income 
growth, the most strongly affected by media, yet it has the strongest independent effect 
on the vote decision. This is a substantially important finding considering that even 
when a majority of the voters believe that the economy is going badly, a plurality still 
believes that the economy would have been worse if the incumbent was replaced by 
someone else.  
Our findings testify both to the capacity of the individuals to anchor their 
economic perceptions on their individual economic fortunes, and to the media’s ability 
to weaken the connections between an individual’s personal experience, her perception 
of the national performance, and her view of the imagined alternatives. We can therefore 
suggest one explanation for why voters, without fooling themselves about their own 
economic situation, may still keep voting for an incumbent performing badly: it is 
because pro-government news media makes the national economic costs of not re-electing 
the incumbent look higher than it probably is.  
This also means that, when the economy is manifestly deteriorating, authoritarian 
incumbents may try to use media influence to convince the electorate that their own 
household experience does not reflect national reality and that the alternatives would be 
even worse. In a recent paper Guriev and Treisman (2018) write of leaders such as Putin 
and Erdogan as “informational autocrats”, who aspire to be loved rather than feared, 
and bolster popular support for their regimes chiefly by the manipulation of information 
(also see Rozenas and Stukal, forthcoming). Previous studies have not tested in the 
individual level whether pro-government new is actually effective in bolstering favorable 
perceptions of economic performance, increasing the voters’ likelihood to vote for the 
incumbent. We now present evidence from Erdogan’s Turkey compatible with this thesis. 
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These findings should be highly relevant to cases of competitive authoritarianism like 
Russia and Hungary, and arguably even to more liberal cases like USA where the 
President Trump has been directing supportive statements to what he sees as friendly 
media groups and verbal attacks towards non-friendly ones (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). 
Our findings should be discussed and corroborated in future work.  
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